Young Adults: Too Many "Nones"
Differences in Generations
I suppose every young generation that comes along is seen by its elders as "unique" and "different", presenting challenges to older and younger alike as we all seek to integrate into a repeatedly reshaped adult world. The current experience is unique historically in having so many different generations active in work and in life at the same time. Their various backgrounds mean they have differing outlooks on how to move forward. Sociologists and business management experts remind us, for starters, that older generations came out of the aftermath of World War II: these people are accustomed to top-down management systems in fixed institutions in which they put great store; they are rules-oriented in setting priorities and in devising methods of accomplishing tasks[1].
Baby-Boomers were teenagers in the Sixties and filled with idealism and possibilities; they saw opportunities for growth and expansion and competed to be on the top of those developments. But their children, the young adults of today, see that, rather than coming out on top, a good portion of the Boomers got laid off; the younger people saw or lived through more and more of their parents divorcing. They observed or were even the victims of scandalous behavior by government, business and religious leaders. For today's Millennial Generation, then, perspectives are different; "institutions" aren't so trustworthy anymore and the rules of the game change frequently. These twenty-somethings thus tend to believe in getting while the getting is good. They don't have to wait for anything nor do they want to wait, seemingly, with instant communication, immediate gratification and generous amounts of feedback and stroking from their elders. They are ethnically diverse and believe much in their lives is subject to their own choices, not something they have to take on someone else's authority.
What Are "Nones"? -- and Why?
More pertinent to our discussion, fewer young people are growing up with religion and many who do, drop out. Among sociologists, these people who have no religion (regardless of age) are referred to by the moniker representing their response on surveys: "what is your religious preference, if any?" They are "the Nones". According to the widely followed biennial General Social Survey[2], "the Nones" doubled as a share of the population from 7% in 1991 to 14% in 2000. Within the Millennial Generation, ages 18-30, the proportion rose from 11% to just over 20% in 2004. Later data from this and other surveys indicate that as many as 25% of young adults are presently outside religion.
We could go on at length here about possible reasons for this falling away, but we'll just emphasize what we see as the most significant. Some "issues" are rooted in the rigidity of some organized religion, which clashes with young people's evolving flexible and discretionary approaches to life and work. The biggest single factor outsiders named in the Barna Group's unChristian survey work in 2006[3] is the anti-homosexuality that predominates in conservative denominations, along with judgmental attitudes the young people perceive in those churches.
Some simpler, more objective reasons are centered in immigration. An influx of Chinese and other Asians and of Hispanics makes this generation more ethnically diverse than older generations. The Asians in particular and even the Hispanics have come with less religious background[4].
Most basically, though, fewer kids are being raised in church-going families. The General Social Survey includes a question about what religion its respondents were raised in. These results are reported by year of birth. Of the Boomers born in the 1950s, 95.6% grew up in some kind of religion, making the Nones a mere 4.4% of that population cohort. By the 1970s, almost 10% of children born then were Nones and of those born in the 1980s, Nones reached 13.5%. By contrast, the proportion of kids raised as Protestants fell from 60% for the 1950s generation to 50% in the 1970s and just 45% of the 1980s group.
This dwindling in the share of religious kids is ironic, isn't it, since in the previous article, we noticed how the visible presence of children contributes to growth in churches. Further, the study of psychology highlights how important to someone's entire lifespan are the lessons and habits formed early on. Even economists (!) have learned that expenditures on early-childhood education bring gains much later in someone's earnings potential and also minimize later public spending on remedial learning and law enforcement.
In that regard, we thought as we envisioned this commentary that we'd be talking about ethical lapses in society that might result from a less-churched population. An increase in those may well be the case. Certainly, there is increased risk behavior among younger people – more casual sex, more binge drinking, more violence [5]. But our Google-searches on this topic turned up a much deeper phenomenon: the formation of one's identity is helped in a significant way by having a religious affiliation. Young people who are religious are connected to society in other ways, while those who are not religious have fewer attachments of all kinds.
This revelation comes to us from just about the opposite end of the spectrum from the Evangelical-oriented surveying by the Barna Group. Now, we're reading a 2005 study from Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research (GQRR), an organization some of you may know from their election polling for liberal Democrat political candidates. This current work, titled OMG! How Generation Y Is Redefining Faith in the iPod Era, was sponsored by Reboot, a Jewish organization concerned about the young people of that faith[6].
Religion Intricately Intertwined with Who I Am
Personal identity has traditionally been associated with family, gender, ethnic origin and birthplace, all factors derived "naturally" as givens in our individual lives. Now, though, as the report explains, with society in flux and people more and more mobile, identity has morphed into something we acquire. The report cites leading religion sociologist Robert Wuthnow: identity is "increasingly achieved rather than something ascribed to us." [7] In these data, family remains far and away the most significant aspect of identity, but political beliefs and job are second and third, even several points ahead of gender. Ethnic origin and where you live rank lower down. Religion has a fairly neutral rating, taken alone, but it interacts with other factors, making it a catalyst.
The GQRR survey was conducted in the autumn of 2004 and covered 1,385 people aged 18 to 25 from all over the country. Additional numbers of Jews, Muslims, Asians, Blacks and Hispanics were included in "over-samples". Of the base group, 26% were Protestant, 20% Roman Catholic, 14% "other Christian", 2% Jewish, 2% Muslim; the remainder were a collection of Eastern religions and "other". The Nones comprised 23%, that is, more than Catholics and almost as much as Protestants. The definitive finding in the study is best expressed in the report's own words [8]:
"Importantly, religious youth have a stronger sense of themselves than less religious youth. In other words, among the less religious, religion is not supplanted by a stronger ascribed or achieved characteristic. In fact, less religious youth are less strongly identified with anything at all, which suggests that religious group involvement is mutually reinforcing of other identities, or that a feeling connected to a religious community or tradition heightens all other aspects of self-understanding. Religious adherence, in other words, builds social capital not just in terms of participation in civic life, but also in terms of connection with family, self-esteem, and self-understanding. And then, as Christian Smith [another well-known religion sociologist] finds in his study of teenagers, religious youth ranked higher than less religious youth on every measure of self-esteem."
This reminds us of something we heard ourselves say last time. Hear it again: "These [aspects of church life] – community, worship and openness – are unique qualities of a church. It reaches out to people and wants to help them lead better lives. It has no ulterior motive . . . . its under-girding raison d'etre is to lift up its people for their own sake."
Where this happens, it works, we see through this Jewish-led study of young people. It works for our kids at the most sensitive times of their lives. Our quest this Lenten season is to find ways to be an inviting church. It seems that we have a lot of work to do. But then what a celebration of Easter we could have. Amen.
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[1] Generation characterizations come from a definitive work in this area: When Generations Collide by Lynne C. Lancaster and David Stillman. New York: Harper Collins Publishers Inc. 2002 and 2005. Lancaster is a Baby-Boomer and Stillman a Generation X-er.
[2] National Opinion Research Center. University of Chicago and other universities. Sample size about 4,800; latest polling 2006. See http://www.norc.org/GSS+Website for all the detail.
[3] David Kinnaman and Greg Lyons. unChristian. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books. 2007. Associated websites: http://www.unchristian.com/ and the Barna Group: http://www.barna.org/.
[4] "Reboot Frequency Questionnaire". Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research: http://www.gqrr.com/index.php?ID=1218, Survey Results, pp. 1 & 6. Accessed February 17, 2008.
[5] The Pew Research Center for The People and The Press. A Portrait of Generation Next:
How Young People View Their Lives, Futures and Politics. January 9, 2007. http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=300. Accessed February 11, 2008.
[6] Anna Greenberg. OMG! How Generation Y Is Redefining Faith in the iPod Era. http://www.gqrr.com/. Accessed February 16, 2008. ["OMG!" = "Oh, m'God!" If you didn't know this text-messaging acronym, you probably should really read the report!] See other supporting material on the GQRR website. GQRR gives this stuff away; no email or other identifying registration is even necessary. So does the Pew organization, for that matter.
[7] Greenberg, p. 13.
[8] Greenberg, p. 15.